In the study of evolution, biological or cultural, a critical element is a methodology fOI distinguishing homologous from analogous characters. The histOIical knowledge this requires must be sought in the phylogeny of the modem groups under study and their com mon ancestors. Applying the methods for detennining the phy logenetic relationships among cultural groups defined some years ago by Romney and VOg! to the results of recent archaeological and historical linguistic work, we examine Polynesia as a well defined case of cultural "radiation" and divergence for which the specific shared ancestral traits can be distinguished from conver gent developments in response to common selection pressures. We go on to present a series of hypotheses regarding some major factors underlying divergence and convergence in Polynesia in the hope that others will be stimulated to test them and thereby ad vance our understanding of this region.
Despite its roller-coaster-like history of popularity amongst anthropologists, the idea that evolution is fun damental to the understanding of cultural diversity pre dates even the Darwinian Revolution, Unfortunately, a resurgence of one kind of cultural evolutionism (often called neo-evolution) which still bore the shackles of Spencerianism ended up mired in a semantic morass of static evolutionary types-Ifbands, chiefdoms, states/! linked to concepts of orthogenesis and linear progress (Sahlins and Service '960, Service r962, Fried '967, Car neiro 1970 ). Yet the anthropological goal of "understand ing diversity" calls for an evolutionary theory of culture change l just as the explanation of organic diversity has depended upon neo-Darwinian theoretical advances (Dunnell r9801 .
In his inimitable style, Flannery (r983b:3621 recently declared that /lif evolution is what you are interested in, then anthropology includes archaeology or it is noth ing." To borrow further from his discussion, the promise of archaeology for the development of a cultural evolu tionary theory is exactly analogous to that of paleontol ogy in the study of biological evolution Icf. Dunnell 1982:2 I) . We will take this analogy between archaeology and paleontology slightly further. Paleontology has made some of its most e;nduring contributions to evolu tionary theory when it has concentrated upon the study of divergence or radiation in groups of phy10genetically related lineages (Gould '980, Mayr 1982) . George Gay lord Simpson's monographs on equid evolution (I95r) and the insights which these brought to general patterns of adaptive radiation and speciation are a classic example. It is not iust the ability to trace change over lengthy time periods that renders both paleontology and archaeology powerful disciplines for evolutionary study; equally im portant is their ability to reveal the material conditions of variation and the selective forces that resulted in change and divergence. But more, as Gould (1986) has so eloquently argued, the success of the Darwinian concept of evolution rests upon the "triumph of homology" the recognition that history matters. The significant contribution of paleontology (along with systematics in general) within the biological sciences is a rigorous methodology as well as the empirical evidence for estab lishing homologies, thus clearing the path for the analy sis of evolutionary process. "Once we map homologies properly, we can finally begin to ask interesting biolog ical questions about function and development-that is, we can use morphology for its intrinsic sources of en lightenment, and not as an inherently flawed measure of genealogical relationships" (Gould 1986:68) . For the study of cultural evolution, archaeology (in conjunction with its sister historical disciplines j including campara· tive linguistics) offers the same promise of disentangling "homology and analogy, history and immanence," thus providing the foundation for addressing real issues of evolutionary process.
Unfortunately, in recent years archaeologists have tended to focus exclusively on a f1 systemic ll approach which disregards history. Dunnell (1986: 38-391 ob served that a major element in the shift in American archaeology from Ilculture history" to the II new ar chaeology/I was a focus on analogous, rather than ho mologous, similarities. "Explanations of analogous similarities have to be sought in laws that account for the appearance of particular forms under specifiable con ditions rather than in the history of the data.... Predict ably, the new archaeology took a dim view of diffusion and other processes that explain homologous similar ities" (p. 39). What the new archaeologists failed to grasp is that the investigation of analogous similarity or con vergence requires a prior methodology for establishing whether observed phenomena are indeed analogous. If not, presumed functional convergences may prove to be "juSt history.1I There cannot be a science of evolution, whether biological or cultural, that does not account for the historical issues (d. Mayr '982, Gould 1986 ). Our view is that archaeologists who would understand cultural evolution as process not only must eschew Spencerian notions of "general" evolution in favor of a materialist lor nonessentialistl concept of "specific" evolution but will profit most by concentrating upon historically specifiable cases of divergence, where two or more phylogenetically related cultures (or societies, if one prefers! have arisen from a common ancestor. In such cases, where homology can be disentangled from convergent response to shared conditions, archaeologists can begin to apply evolutionary principles in a properly "timelike" explanatory framework, in which cause is ultimate and explanation is historical (Dunnell t982:91. In this approach, it is explicitly recognized that the sci ence of evolution-in which history matters, and in which postdiction rather than prediction is the key method of verification-is fundamentally different from the science of physics. It is, however, no less a science.
This approach is not wholly untried in archaeology. Flannery (1983 a:2-3) cites a number of studies orga nized on the phylogenetic theme as the theoretical bases for the interpretation of the Zapotec and Mixtec civiliza tions (Flannery and Marcus 19831 . Significantly, among the earliest studies cited by him are those of Goodenough (r955) and Sahlins (1958) for Polynesia. During the period from the late '950S through the '70S, while Polynesian archaeology was developing a modem form and a coherent data set (Kirch '982) , interest in evolution on the part of prehistorians elsewhere in the world eschewed particularistic homology and centered on what Sahlins and Service (1960) termed "general evo lution," the evolution out of a lower stage of succes sively higher levels of sociopolitical integration (e.g., Sanders and Price 1968 on Mesoamerical. These were frequently formed with the conceptual schemes of Stew ard (r955), Service (19621. Fried Ir9671, and Carneiro (r9701, in which orthogenetic notions of "progress" (or "higher levels" of sociocultural integration) continued to dominate. In the Polynesian area, however, where the archaeological remains all seemed to fit comfortably within one such step or stage (i.e., as a series of Neolithic chiefly societies), such concerns had minimal impact, as they offered little promise of improving interpretation of the data being recovered. Rather, the Polynesian efforts of those decades fit more comfortably within that which Sahlins and Service (19601 termed "specific evolution," the tracing of particular historical trajectories of individ ual culture complexes over significant periods of time lsometimes also termed "multilinear evolution" Id.
Steward r95 511. We shall argue that the result of this has been to set the stage for a proper evolutionary approach in Polynesian prehistory. It is to the promise of Polyne sian archaeology for unraveling both historical pathways and general processes of cultural evolution that we ad dress the remainder of this essay.
The Phylogenetic Model
If we are to apply a phylogenetic model of evolution in archaeology and prehistory, we must have a clear idea of what is meant by a phylogenetic unit in cultural terms and how such a unit can be delineated. It simply will not do to declare any assemblage of seemingly related cul tures an evolutionary I/lineage" or "clade." Indeed, we must have a precise and rigorous methodology for the establishment of cultural homologies, just as mor phological systematics, cladistics, and molecular phy logeny have provided a methodology for inferring biolog ical history from its contemporary results. In fact, such a cultural evolutionary unit and the requisites for its em pirical delineation were outlined some years ago by Romney (1957; see also Eggan 1954) . Romney termed his approach the "genetic modeV' which /ltakes as its seg ment of cultural history a group of tribes which are set off from all other groups by sharing a common physical type, possessing common systemic patterns, and speak ing genetically related languages" (p. 361. This "segment of cultural history," which Romney called the "genetic unit/' includes "the ancestral group and all intermediate groups, as well as the tribes in the ethnographic present" (pp. 36-371. In stressing that the "tribes" or groups under consideration should have demonstrable relationships linguistically, physically, and culturally (in "systemic pattern"), Romney outlined the criteria by which such a "genetic unit" could be rigorously defined Ip. 36):
Physical type and language, we would say, have no causal relationship; there is no functional reason why a given physical type should occur with a given lan guage family. Therefore, when these two variables do show significant concordance in their distribution this may well represent an important historical fact, namely that the explanation for their concordance can be traced to a common point somewhere in the past. A demonstration that these two factors are also uniquely accompanied by a systemic culture pat em ... would strengthen the belief in a common origin.
Romney's propositions were substantially expanded and refined by Vogt It964) in the introductory essay to a symposium on Maya cultural development IVogt and Ruz Lhuillier t964; see also review by Sanders 1966) . In brief, the genetic model assumes that genetically related tribes, as determined by related languages, physical types, and systemic patterns, are derived from a small proto-group with a proto-culture at some time in the past. The model resembles that of the zoologist who views a certain species of animal as evolving and making an adaptive adjustment to a given ecological niche and then radiating from this paint as the population expands into neighboring ecological niches. As the population moves into diI ferent ecological settings, further adaptive variations occur in the species. But these variations are trace· able to the ancestral animal, or l in other words l back to the ploto-type.
In the genetic model, as applied to human popula tions/ we assume that a small proto-group succeeds in adapting itself efficiently to a certain ecological niche and in developing certain basic systemic parterns which constitute the basic aspeClS of the proto cultule. lf the adaptation proves to be efficient, the population expands, and the group begins to radiate from this point of dispelsal. As members split off from the prow-group and move into neighboring ecological niches, they make appropriate adaptations to these new situations and begin to diffelentiate-KIRCH AND GREEN Evolution in Polynesia 1433 that is, there are adaptive variations from the proto type over time as the members of the genetic unit spread from the dispersal area.
Despite the obvious emphasis in Vogt's discussion on ecological adaptation as the driving force behind diver gence within the genetic unit, he also mentions II culture contact ll with other groups and "internal biological, lin guistic/ and cultural 'drifts' II as general factors leading to change. Vogt stops short, however, of developing the full evolutionary implications of the genetic model, ig noring such critical concepts as variation and selection.
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, Vogt's essay de fines a series of analytical steps by which a genetic unit can be precisely and unambiguously delineated. As Vogt notes l these steps involve lithe combined use of a num ber of linguistic, archaeological, physical anthro pological, ethnological, and historical methods bringing to bear the full range of anthropological data as these become available from field and archival research " (1964: 12) . Stressing the analytical rigor of comparative and historical linguistics, Vogt proposes that analysis begin with "the definition of genetic units in terms of genetically related languages." The steps of analysis are then (I) plot the distribution of related languages; 12) calculate time depth, using lexicostatistics and glorto chronology; 131 locate the dispersal area and spread of the protogroup, 141 reconstruct the protolanguage and pro toculture utilizing the linguistic methods of lexical re construction, 15) use archaeological data to test the hy potheses generated by steps 3 and 4; 161 check the sequence of divergences derived from linguistic and ar chaeological data with the evidence of physical an thropology, 17) use ethnohistorical materials to "provide readings on the various branches of the genetic unit" between the time of European contact and the presentj and (81 add ethnographic data on contemporary com munities to IImap variations in systemic patterns that have survived from earlier time levels and to detect cul tural 'drifts' or trends that are still occurring in these living systems" Ip· 131·
These analytical steps constitute a methodology for the delineation of an evolutionarily meaningful unit whose subunits can be demonstrated to have diverged from a common ancestor according to a historical se quence which can be precisely defined in both time and space. We believe that the choice of the term "genetic unit ll is unfortunate/ however/ as it may easily lead to confusion between cultural and strictly genetic or biological evolutionary processes (a problem obviously foreseen by Romney in his caveats [1957: 3711· We prefer the term "phylogenetic unit," which places the empha sis on the essential aspect of the model-the delineation of phylogenies or historical sequences of divergence from a common ancestor-and use this term below. closely with archaeological evidence and with properly genetic models of population distance based on both metrical and nonmetrical skeletal traits {Pielrusewsky '970, 19711· As reviewed above, Romney (1957) and Vogt 11964, see also Sanders 19661 established the main elements of a methodological framework for phylogenetic analysis of cultural groups, that is, a method for precisely inferring cultural history from its results, establishing phylogeny, and permitting the disentanglement of homology from analogy. What has been accomplished in Polynesian ar chaeology over the past three decades is precisely to fulfill most of the conditions specified by Vogt as neces sary to the employment of this framework. The first element is that the tribes, societies, or ethnic groups of "Triangle Polynesia" (see fig. II share a physical type (Howells '979, Houghton 19801, systemic cultural pat terns (Burrows '939a, Sahlins 1958 , Goldman 1970 , and historically related languages (Biggs '971, Clark 19791 which allow them to be grouped together as a unit of historical analysis or, as Romney {1957: 361 calls it, a "substantive segment of cultural history/' Le., a phy logenetic evolutionary unit.
Polynesia as a Phylogenetic Unit
Other societies which are also called "Polynesian" but sometimes fail to exhibit these characteristics in all three respects are grouped together under the term Out lier Polynesia ( fig. I ). Though they certainly have a com mon linguistic ancestry with the other Polynesian soci eties (Pawley 1967) , they share a variety of cultural, archaeological, and physical anthropological features with their Micronesian and Melanesian neighbors IBay ard 1976; Kirch I984b, 1985 b; Blake et al. '983, How ells 1973) . This situation is Ihe result of significant his torical contact with these unrelated or distantly related Micronesian/Melanesian societies (Kirch 1986 b) . The Outlier populations are thought to have originated in the West Polynesian area, aiter the development of a distinc tive Polynesian race, language, and culture there, and to have been "blown backII on drift voyages into Mi cronesia/Melanesia, where they established themselves on some of the smaller and often more remote islands of these regions (Kirch 1984b; Ward, Webb, and Levison r9731· The second element of the phylogenetic framework requi1es that there be convergence as the history of each group is traced back in time and that this be exhibited in physical type, language, and systemic cultural pattern. This is certainly the situation for the societies of East Polynesia, which converge into a recognizable East Poly nesian language subgroup IGreen '966, '985; Clark 1979) , an archaic East Polynesian cultUIe IBellwood '979, Kirch 1986a) , and a common physical type (Pi etrusewsky '970, 197 II. These in tum converge with the West Polynesian groups to form a Proto-Polynesian lan guage {Pawley 1966; Biggs '97r, '9791, an ancestral Polynesian culture or society (Kirch 1984a :41-69) , and a parental Polynesian population (Howells r979; Hough ton 1980; Pietrusewsky '970, 19711. (In order Houghton, personal communication, 1986) . Through migration, descendants of this original Lapita group spread over an extensive territory/ while Polynesia (including Outlier PolynesiaI and the original unit be came internally differentiated biologically, linguisti cally, and culturally. In Vogr's view, a cultural phylogenetic unit must be defined linguistically because of the relative exactness of linguistic methods as compared with those of ethnog raphy and archaeology. This is certainly true for the Polynesian case, where all of the daughter languages and dialects belong to a linguistically well-marked subgroup in the Central Pacific subgroup of Oceanic Austronesian languages. Thus every case of a society considered for inclusion has a Polynesian language as the primary basis for defining it as suitable for consideration, although se lected cultural attributes or physical characteristics which distinguish a Polynesian genotype and phenotype could also be set out. In many other areas of the world where isolation as a factor is not so great as in Polynesia and contacts with unrelated or distantly related societies and cultures are more frequent, this methodological principle may be more difficult to apply.
We will now review the analytical steps for the definition of a phylogenetic unit in terms of what has been accomplished for Polynesia within the past three decades.
I. Plot the distribution of the related languages. From the geographical distribution of Polynesian languages shown in figure I , it can be seen that the languages of the "Polynesian Triangle" form a cohesive geographic unit in which only Polynesian languages are present. In con trast, the languages of the Polynesian Outliers are dis tributed along the northern and eastern fringes of Melanesia, in close proximity to a number of other Oceanic languages. This heightens the probability of ex ternal contact and linguistic borrowing at various times in their respective histories. Figure 2 shows the sub grouping of Polynesian languages in terms of their branching historical relationships, a key element in es tablishing phylogenetic relationships between various Polynesian groups.
2. Calculate the approximate time depth of the lin guistic differentiation. Clark (1979:62-631 , on the basis of lexicostatistics and glottochronological considera tions, puts the separation of Proto·Polynesian from Proto-Fijian Ibased on Bauan Fijian) at 1500 B.C. and the breakup of Proto-Polynesian at around A.D. 1. Green (1981) , in a more closely argued case based on both ar chaeology and linguistic evidence, agrees that Proto Central Pacific and its breakup date to ca. 1500 B.C. but suggests various dates in the middle of the 1st millen nium B.C. as more probable for Proto-Polynesian before it split into Tongic and Nuclear Polynesian branches. This is because the breakup of Nuclear Polynesian into Samoic Outlier and East Polynesian can be reliably ar gued to have begun by about the 1st century A.D. if not before. Similarly, Kirch (I984a) argues that an ar chaeologically recognizable ancestral Polynesian society existed by ca. 500 B.C. In short, becoming Polynesian linguistically (the pre-Polynesian stagel took place be tween 1500 and 500 B.C., and languages and dialects we would today identify as Polynesian existed only afrer ca. JOO B.C. and have retained markers of that status ever since.
_. (Pawley and Green 1984) Kirch 1984al· 4. Reconstruct the protolanguage and the protoculture from the linguistic data. Biggs (1979) has reconstructed about 3,000 Proto-Polynesian lexical items and their common meanings, and from it Pawley and K. Green (19711 have drawn a carefully selected data set bearing on the main outlines of the protoculture. To this, cui· tural items have been progressively added (Kirch 1984: 41-69; Green 1986) .
5. Test the linguistic reconstructions with archaeolog· ical data. Kirch 11984al has coordinated these lexical reconstructions of Proto·Polynesian with the data of ar chaeology to define an ancestral Polynesian culture, and Green (1986) has set out male formally the strategies by which this may be done using linguistic, ethnological, and ethnohistoric as well as archaeological data. Fur· thermore, the sequence of dispersal and colonization leading to the modern distribution of Polynesian groups has been thoIOughly investigated archaeologically and essentially confirms the linguistic subgrouping model !Jennings '979, Kirch 1984a Polynesian societies known in the 19th and 20th cen· turies. Correction of this bias through careful evaluation of the ethnohistoric sources is now taking place with the work of such scholars as Oliver 119741 in Tahiti, Salm· ond 119751 in New Zealand, Sahlins (1981, 19851 in Hawaii, and Dening (19801 and Thomas 1'986) yond Polynesia to incorporate a wider sample of Oceanic societies, is the study by Marshall (19841 of structural patterns of sibling classification. Marshall's paper points to the great potential of controlled comparisons of sys temic patterns within phylogenetic units.
In sum, specific evolutionary divergence within the Polynesian phylogenetic unit can now be studied simul· taneously from several perspectives. Polynesian scholars are in a good position to address processual questions in cultural evolution, since the empirical basis for deter mining which Polynesian cultural similarities are sim· pIe homologies of a contingent history and which are convergences (independently evolved analogies1 in reo sponse to common or repeated functional problems is now in place. With the branching relationships between Polynesian societies firmly established, it is possible to use the older ethnographic and ethnohistoric data in a more rigorous, controlled fashion, as, for example, in the search for convergent structures or for persistent or ho mologous traits reflecting a common ancestor. Histor· icallinguistics further aids in the lexical reconstruction To understand and ultimately explain evolutionary change in Polynesia requires that the common ancestral culture or society be precisely delineated and exten sively reconstructed. The origins of ancestral Polynesian society (Kirch 1984a) by ca. 500 B.C. out of an earlier Lapita cultural complex are now fairly well understood and have been briefly summarized above. The impor tance of accurately reconstructing this ancestral society is underscored by the observation that fleach culture is a product not merely of its current adaptation but of its past history" (Flannery 1983a:3;  The Ieconstruction of ancestral Polynesian society has been advanced using not only the direct evidence of ar chaeology but also lexical Ieconstruction and controlled ethnographic comparison (see Kirch 1984a , Green 1986 ). The material culture and technology are now well docu mented, both archaeologically and lexically. Archae· ologically, detailed temporal sequences of change in ceramics, adzes, and unretouched lithics have been de veloped which document the emergence of ancestral Polynesian society out of a more generalized Lapita an· cestor.
In the area of subsistence, an earlier debate about whether ancestlal Polynesians were agriculturalists (Groube 19711 has been Iesolved, and the impoltance of both the taro-yam complex and cellain tree crops such as breadfruit can be argued from the lexical and ethnobo tanical evidence (Yen 19731 . The triad of domestic ani· mals-pig, dog, and fowl-has been shown to be a com· ponent of ancestral Polynesian production. Advances have also been made in our knowledge of the range of marine exploitation strategies practiced by ancestral Polynesian populations. Cellain specialized production technologies, such as anaerobic pit fennentation"and en· silage of starch pastes, have been documented both ar· chaeologically and lexically (Kirch 1984a) . Ancestral Polynesian settlement patterns are less well understood, although the lexical evidence suggests a variety of func tionally differentiated structures (Green 19861. More di rect archaeological work, however, needs to be devoted to the structure and variabiliry of ancestral Polynesian household units.
It is also possible to make a number of statements regarding ancestral Polynesian social relations, largely on the evidence of lexical reconstruction and controlled ethnographic comparison. Understanding ancestral so· cial structure is especially critical to an analysis of Poly nesian cultural evolution, since much of the subsequent divergence in Polynesian groups was in such areas as descent·group structure, rank, stratification, and territo· rial control (Sahlins '958, Goldman 19701. Hereditary chieftainship was certainly an aspect of ancestral Poly· nesian society, a structure which is probably tlaceable to the even older Lapita ancestral group (Hayden 1983 
It is not our aim to review in detail the nature of ances
tral Polynesian society, other than to demonstrate that prehistorians can now reconstruct the key elements of the common ancestral society from which all later Poly nesian groups diverged. We want to stress, however, that not enough is yet known of the range of variation in that society. It is important that in reconstructing ancestral Polynesian society we avoid a normative, essentialist characterization which masks significant variation. We already know that valiation existed, for example, in ceramics (Kirch 19811 , and a knowledge of such variation may provide essential keys to the first stages in evolu tionary divergence.
THE PERSISTENCE OF ANCESTRAL PATTERNS
Because the phylogenetic relationships between Polyne· sian cultures are now well understood and because we have been able to reconstruct much of the ancestral cuI· tUle, linguistically as well as archaeologically, Polyne sian prehistorians are able to make reasonable assertions about the persistence of specific ancestral patterns in into ethnographic examples in Polynesian bark cloth and tattooing and may be explained by common inher· itance. Likewise, many of the basic structural elements of each of the chiefly Polynesian societies reflect just such homolOgies. As Kirch 1'984a:28,-821 demon strates, the office of chief, the lineage concepts associ· ated with it, the fundamental notions of mana and tapu, and the category of warrior and the attendant focus on status rivalry were not invented anew by each Polyne sian society. Rather, these aspects of ancestral Poly nesian society were all inherited by descendent pop ulations, even as they were transformed into new variations.
Some In sum, three decades of intensive archaeological work have provided a mass of detailed temporal data on evolu tionary change in Polynesia. While there are still gaps to be filled, each major geographic segment of Polynesia has at least one and usually more than one island or archipelago for wmch the record can already be charac terized as continuous or finely divided, as well as rich in the diversity of available data lfig. 4). While it will be necessary to fill certain empirical gaps in the course of testing particular hypotheses, we conclude that Polyne sian scholars are well positioned to ask meaningful ques tions about evolutionary process.
Evolutionary Process: Some Initial Propositions
Having argued the importance of history and phylogeny in cultural evolution and demonstrated that Polynesian phylogenetic relationships are now well understood (thus allowing the disentanglement of specific homolo gies from convergences I, we now tum to the matter of evolutionary process in Polynesia. Specifically, we ad dress what we believe to be key factors leading to both divergence and convergence between Polynesian soci eties. The propositions which follow are intended not as conclusions but as a set of hypotheses of evolutionary process which we hope others will be stimulated to test on the rich archaeological data of Polynesian prehistory.
MECHANISMS OF DIVERGENCE
Isolation. Among the mechanisms of divergence which we can recognize within Polynesia, the most fundamen tal is isolation, the key factor which renders oceanic islands ideal theaters for phylogenetic studies. Coloniza Easter Island and the Chathams, apparently completely isolated following initial settlement. The Hawaiian Is lands and New Zealand were also relatively isolated but may have had some secondary contact with other Poly nesian groups (Finney r977) . At the other extreme, some central East and West Polynesian archipelagoes had significant and continuous contacts with neighboring groups throughout prehistory; the significance of such low-level isolation will be further discussed below.
The founder effect. The importance of random sampling effects or I'drift" in the divergence of two isolated populations has long been recognized (Mayr r94 2 ) and, as Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (r98r) argue, is doubtless a significant mechanism for cultural evolution as well. In islands, drift resulting from the colonization of a new island by a propagule which represents a sub sample of the mother population has been termed "the founder effect" . Vayda and Rappaport (1963"34-35) described the mechanism sue cinctly: lIif the migration to an isolated place, whether a small island or a large continent, is by a relatively small group of people who are unable to reproduce in full the culture of the population from which they derived, then the culture in the new place will be immediately differ ent from the culture in the homeland." In Polynesia, the founder effect played a role in initial divergence between colonizing groups, both culturally and biologically (el. Houghton tg80, Terrell n.d. .
Such behavioral and technological innovation is sub ject to selection (both natural and cultural Isee Cavalli Sforza and Feldman Ig8111 in that innovations perceived as successfullcultural selection) or those which contrib ute to population fitness Inatural selection1are differen tially transmitted. An archaeological example of selec tion and differential transmission over time can be found in East Polynesian fishing technologies. The sud den ptoliferation of fishhook types in the Marquesan colonization period and the longitudinal transmission and persistence of only a limited subset of this initial variation offers an unambiguous instance of selection contingent upon colonization (Kirch rg80a, b, fig. 231 revealed a local occupation se quence in which a remarkable technological adaptation to the environmental constraints of this upraised lime stone (makatea-typel island is documented in fishing gear, adzes, and other tools. That the small Polynesian population was intensively exploiting the limited faunal resources on Henderson in an effoIt to survive is further suggested by the faunal evidence for the local extinction of a storm petrel and two pigeon species ISteadman and Olson Ig85). Stratigraphic excavations on other aban doned Polynesian islands, such as Nihoa and Necker, have the potential to reveal much about the processes of island colonization under the most marginal conditions. Area effects and ecological constraints were signifi cant in cases of successful colonization as well. It is surely no coincidence that the most highly stratified Polynesian societies arose in large, resource-rich ar chipelagoes or that atoll societies with the most linrited resources generally remained at the lowest levels of sociopolitical complexity and integration (Sahlins 19581. It is essential, however l not to take these environmental correlations to the extreme of environmental determin ism; in Polynesia, as elsewhere, local ecosystems posed constraints and offered possibilities, but it was cultur ally directed human actors who were the active agents of sociopolitical change.
Long-term environmental selection. While coloniza tion often entailed radical shifts in environmental pa rameters, the selective effects of environment were not limited to the early stages in island settlement. External contact. Isolation is relative in Oceania, and external contact played varying Ioles in the evolutionary trajectories of specific societies. There has been a ten dency to extoll the "laboratory-likeII virtues of oceanic islands that accrue from isolation, but this notion of closed systems can be carried too far. To some degree, the significance of external contact can be predicted by a knowledge of geographic isolation (in which both dis tance and configurational effects must be taken into ac countl. It is, however, the archaeological record that pro vides the best gauge of external contact as a mechanism of divergence for any parricular group. A case in point is Tikopia (KiICh 1986bl, the evolutionary trajectory of which was drastically affected at several times by a vari ety of external forces, including later immigration, long distance exchange, and drift voyaging. Similarly, Best (I984) has extensively documented, with archaeological evidence, the complex history of external contact which has helped to shape the prehistOIic sequence of Lakeba in the Lau Islands. As our archaeological knowledge of external contact has increased J it has become evident that relatively few Oceanic islands were ever fully isolated and, to the contrary, many of those in the south western Pacific have been part of extensive long distance exchange systems for hundreds or even thousands of years. The teasing out of these prehistoric exchange networks from archaeological data is a major task facing Oceanic prehistory today.
PARALLEL EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES
Other major factors of evolutionary change in Polynesia resulted not in divelgence, but in significant homoplasy or parallel evolurionary plocesses. We discuss three of these common trends below.
Demographic factors. Archaeological evidence sug
gests that Polynesian colonizing propagules were small, probably fewer than 100 persons in most cases. A lepra ductive strategy emphasizing fecundity and a high in trinsic growth rate would have offered the highest selec tive value for such small propagules {indeed, anything less than a high-r strategy would have courted Iapid ex tinction [see McArthur, Saunders, and Tweedie r976J}. Thus, by the time of European intrusion, all of these island societies had reached relatively high density levels with density-dependent cultural controls on popu lation growth (including abortion, infanticide, celibacy, and various forms of overt competition)_ On virtually every island there was thus a transition from an initial stage in which selection favored a high-growth demo graphic strategy to a late prehistoric stage favoring suc cessful competition over growth. This kind of demo graphic transition has received much attention in the theory of island biogeography, where it is generally re ferred to as the rlK-selection continuum {McArthur and Wilson r967 ; Pianka 1970; Diamond 1977; Kirch 1980b:42 (e.g., adz productionj. The specific forms of intensifica tion are frequently unique to particular islands, reflect ing local environmental conditions as well as the histor ical results of the founder effect and initial colonization processes (see above). Thus, for example, agricultutal intensification in Tonga had its agronomic expression in dry-field rotation of yams and aloids with a significant arboricultutal element, while in Hawaii both dry-field cropping of sweet potato and the irrigation of taro were carried to intensive levels. Despite the particular form of expression, however, the underlying trend-in creased labor input per unit area and investment in per· manent facilities-is reflected in virtually all Polyne sian societies. We believe that this trend reflects, in part, common Iesponses to identical or highly similar sets of selective plessures, notably population growth and envi ronmental circumscription. Equally significant, how ever, was the shared inheritance of a hierarchical sociopolitical system with an emphasis on interlineage competition and prestation, as well as inherent organiza tional abilities to direct and maintain intensified pro duction systems.
Competition. A third parallel trend widely evident in
Polynesia is increasing competition between sociopolit ical groups over time. The lexically marked social status of "warrior" is reconstructable to Proto-Polynesian, and the systemic social pattern of status rivalry (Goldman 19701 is arguably an aspect of the ancestral society as well. While these social aspects of competition were therefore homologies inherited by all daughter groups, in vinually all Polynesian societies selection appears to have favored new and more overt varieties of competi tion, leading to changes in settlement pattern Ithe con struction of fortifications, as with the New Zealand pa or Rapan hill-forts), war strategies and tactics, and most significantlYI sociopolitical structure and patterns of land tenure. These latter changes were noted some years ago by Burrows (1939b) , who remarked on the parallel shift from landholding groups with a genealogical, lineage basis to an outright territorial pattern based on overt conquest and redistribution. From an evolutionary perspective, we suggest that these parallel developments are again highly significant, reflecting both the persis tence of ancestral cultural patterns Istatus rivalry) and the selective pressures of circumscription} resource limi tation and degradation, ecological perturbations/ ano. population growth.
CONVERGENCE
We must comment briefly on one further aspect of Poly nesian evolution, the analogic emergence of similar traits or structures in two or more societies. In dealing with putative cases of convergence it is essential to eliminate the alternative explanations that such struc· tures reflect the persistence of ancestral forms (homol ogyl or result from contact and borrowing. For example, the elaborate kava ritual of West Polynesia is almost certainly the result of extensive late prehistoric contacts between Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji and cannot be ascribed to convergence. On the other hand, the development of true class stratification in both Tonga and Hawaii, as well as similar structures of dual paramountship in these two societies, cannot be explained by either inher· itance or contact. A more material example is the inven· tion in Hawaii, Easter Island, and New Zealand of the two-piece fishhook, evidently a convergent response to identical functional problems: the absence of suitable pearl shell and the need to overcome shear stress (in bone or stonel in large hooks. The careful search for and analysis of such instances of convergence offers pos sibilities for further isolating and understanding the selective pressures responsible for it.
Summary
We have argued above that in the study of evolution whether biological or cultural-a critical element is a methodology for distinguishing homologous from 'Ulalo-KIRCH AND GREEN Evolution in Polynesia I 443 gous traits or characters. That is, evolution cannot be considered solely as process independent of specific his tory. The historical knowledge required to disentangle homology from analogy must be sought in the phy logeny or branching relationships of the modem groups under study and of their common ancestors. Methods for determining the phylogenetic relationships among cul tural groups, including linguistic and biological as well as archaeological data, were defined some years ago by Romney and Vogr but have seldom been systematically applied in cultural evolutionary studies.
Because of the advantages which islands offer as con trolled situations for evolutionary studies, Polynesia has long been recognized as an ideal region for the investiga tion of cultural evolution. Earlier attempts to deal with the Polynesian case in evolutionary terms were largely unsatisfactory because of a lack of temporally controlled data on prehistoric change. Over the past few decades, however, a resurgence of archaeological and historical linguistic work in Polynesia has now made possible the precise delineation of phylogenetic relationships among Polynesian societies. Furthennore, the archaeological records of prehistoric change for many Polynesian groups are now richly detailed, and the common ances tral group-ancestral Polynesian society-can be recon structed in some detail. As a result of these develop ments/ the potential for evolutionary studies in Polynesia is greater than ever before.
Recognizing that we now have in Polynesia a well defined case of cultural "radiation" and divergence for which the specific historical legacy of shared, ancestral traits can be distinguished from analogic or convergent developments in response to common selection pres· sures, we have also presented a series of initial proposi tions or hypotheses regarding some major factors under lying both divergence and convergence in Polynesia. Given a significant current interest in Oceanic prehis· tory, we hope that others will be stimulated to test these propositions and thereby advance our understanding of this vast region.
Comments

PETER S. BELLWOOD
Prehistory, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. II III 87 Kirch and Green deserve praise for expressing so lucidly an approach to Polynesian prehistory which, to my mind, is the essence of sound common sense. The scat tered islands of Polynesia have provided a unique setting for human biological and cultural evolution and lend themselves well to considerations of history and phy logeny. It is refreshing to see that archaeology is at last moving away from the former fashion of denigrating all forms of culture history and that two leading Polynesian archaeologists feel that the time is ripe to underline the significance of an approach which focusses on such con cepts as common ancestry and homology, as opposed to history-free analogy. I have two additional comments to make from a broader, extra-Oceanic perspective.
Kirch and Green are quite correct to stress the impor tance of small and widely separated islands for a study of evolutionary divergence, but I think that many prehisto rians, and possibly even these two authors, overstress the difficulties of making similar studies in continental or large-island arenas. For instance, I believe that a simi lar approach, utilising comparative data from linguistics, archaeology, and biological anthropology, can be applied quite successfully to all the Austronesian-speaking pop ulations, from Madagascar through the islands of South east Asia and eastward to Polynesia. It is a common assumption amongst prehistorians that islands will tend to have simple culture histories while those of conti nents will tend to be hopelessly intertwined. In many cases this assumption is undoubtedly justified, but each case deserves consideration on its own merits. In their discussion of evolutionary processes, Kirch and Green stress the significance of demographic factors. Apart from the growth trajectories that they discuss, however, there is a much broader general significance to the available data. The Polynesian islands can tell us, relatively unambiguously, just how rapidly small found ing populations (one or two canoe-loads1developed into populations numbering up to 200,000 (as in the Hawai ian case). Small founding populations thus reached unin habited islands, introduced a range of highly productive domesticated plants, and within about a millennium in creased their original population sizes by a conceivable 10,000 times. Statistics of this kind must surely make all of us think very hard about the significance of the earliest developments of food production all over the world. Hypotheses that invoke population pressure as a prime mover behind cultural development may be out of vogue, but hypotheses that deny roles to population growth and expansion in situations where agricultural~ ists had access to suitable environments, either previ ously uninhabited or simply hunted/collected, may be quite unrealistic. From this point of view, Polynesian prehistory has a very important tale to tell.
R. C. DUNNELL
Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195, U.S.A. 2 IV 87
Recognition that tlcultural evolution" in the social sci ences is unrelated to evolutionary theory as employed in the natural sciences (e.g., Blute '979, Dunnell 1980) has renewed interest in using evolutionary theory in ar~ chaeology. Kirch and Green's synthesis of Polynesian prehistory is such an effort. As a preliminary account} their overview has virtues. Most important are the kinds of questions asked of the Polynesian data and the new integration of those data implied by the questions. Varia tion, the importance of distinguishing homologous and analogous simHarities, the crucial role of homology in evolutionary explanation, and the value of documented local extinctions are observations pertinent to a Darwin ian approach.
Beyond terminology and programmatic assertion} however, one struggles in vain to find any vestige of Darwinian evolution here. To the contrary, the approach suggested is Lamarckian and embedded in an essentialist (Mayr '959, Sober r980) metaphysic inimical to the ma terialism underlying Darwinian evolution. In fact, Lamarckian vitalism and essentialism are two promi· nent characteristics of "cultural evolution" that set it apart from scientific evolution. In the last analysis, Kirch and Green offer, at least in methodological terms, a "cultural evolution" model reworked in the terminol· ogy of evolutionary theory. Although these features of their methodological program are pervasive, they are subtle, as witnessed by the long-standing confusion be tween tlcultural evolution" and scientific evolution.
A fundamental characteristic of Darwinian evolution is its two-step structure. The generation of variation is undirected and independent of selection, the process re sponsible for patterning evolutionary change. In spite of their Darwinian intent, Kirch and Green frequently de pict evolution as a one-step process in which variation is directed by the same forces that determine selection. For example} they tell us} "The colonization of a new island often meant a radical shift in environment} in tum re quiring (italics mine) an immediate reassortment or segregation of technology and adaptive strategy." Even more clearlYI statements such as "in Polynesia . .. local ecosystems posed constraints and offered possibilities, but it was culturally directed human actors who were the active agents of sociopolitical change" expose their Lamarckian vitalism. Confusion between reason-giving and scientific cause (Dunnell 19801 allows the incom patibility of these statements with Darwinian evolution to pass unnoticed} just as the same confusion is some· times taken as a justification for a separate "cultural evolution. II In science, cause is embedded in the theoret· kal systemj it is not attributed to the phenomena being studied.
Kirch and Green's commitment to essentialism is less obvious given their criticism of stages, the standard es sentialist constructions of ((cultural evolution/' and their emphasis on variation. But they simply replace stages with smaller-scale essentialist "societies." In the materialist ontology that underlies Darwinism, "things"-be they biological species or sociocultural so cieties-are transitory configurations of continuously changing phenomena. tlThings" do not existj they are always in the process of becoming. That Kirch and Green treat societies as empirical is apparent when they talk about "an ancestral Polynesian culture." Societies are not simply analytic tools for the description of phe nomena. Thus they seem to construe development as the transformation of one society into another. Change, in this framework, is synonymous with difference.
As Mayr 119821 and others (e.g., Hull '965, Lewontin 19741 point out, essentialism is the single greatest im pediment to an understanding of evolutionary theory. Because essentialism characterizes not only the predic tive, ahistorical sciences but also the structure of com mon sense, it creeps into archaeological writing almost invisibly (Dunnell r9821 . KiIch and Green compound this by their efforts to establish a scholarly precedent for their view in the works of Flannery (r983al, Romney (r9571, and Vogr (r964) , all structured by an essentialist metaphysic thinly disguised by the metaphorical use of IIgenetic. 1I As damaging as this entanglement with Lamarckism and essentialism is to Kirch and Green's efforts, their methodology implies an even more basic problem. They argue that evolutionary understanding of Polynesian prehistory is a matter of reinterpreting IIfacts ll that have accumulated over an extended period of investigation. In this they assume that phenomena can be known in an objective, theory-free manner. Yet a principal function of evolurionary theory is to dictate how phenomena must be described in order to be explained by the theory. Failing to realize that adopting a new theory requires the creation of new data is not only the major flaw in Kirch and Green's essay but also the greatest impediment to the implementation of evolutionary theory in archaeol ogy generally. In spite of their intention to use scientific evolution, Kirch and Green revert to IIcultural evolu tion./I Their theory has come to fit their facts, acquired in a different framework.
Essays such as Kirch and Green's are useful first steps in the implementation of scientific evolution in ar chaeology. Practitioners have to be convinced that new insights will be forthcoming, and in this, Kirch and Green have made a contribution. But such essays are damaging when they treat evolutionary theory as an in terpretative algorithm commensurable with previous paradigms. It is all too easy to forget Mayr's (r959) obser vation that evolutionary theory is not just a diffetent theory, it is a different kind of theory. Unril archaeolo gisrs take this admonition to heart in all of irs ramifications, the use of evolutionary theory in ar chaeology will remain a linguistic veneer masking tradi rional archaeology. A central issue in evolutionary study is the unit upon which selection acts. Population biology has the allele, paleontology the species. Kirch and Green are unsure of the selection unit within the Polynesian "phylogenetic unit." Their use of linguistic models suggests language groups, their discussion of failed colonies on small is lands populations, and they refer indiscriminately to cultures and societies, at one point leaving the choice of terms up to the reader. This matter deserves further thought, as interesting propositions are impossible to evaluate with the selection unit unspecified.
TOM DYE
Department of Anthropology
It may be best to preserve the distinction between cul ture and society as notional and relational concepts, re- To support the claim that Polynesia offers a relatively "dense and con tinuous" prehistoric sequence, they review the record of Polynesian archaeology and prehistory, in which both have good reason to take pride; without their primary research, claims of density and continuity could not be sustained. They acknowledge some gaps, and will surely help to fill them, but here they discount the effect these gaps have on the methodology proposed and the inter pretations offered.
For example, in Vogt's first stage the authors add, as a "key element," a somewhat controversial (ef. Clark r9791 subgrouping of the Polynesian languages and the historic relationships that might be inferted from it. This tactic is necessary because lexicostatistics prove umeliable with languages related as closely as those of central East Polynesia (Vogt's Stage 21 and because the early portions of the archaeological sequences for the Society Islands, Easter Island, the Tuamotus, and Hawai'i are poorly known (Vogt's Stage 51. Again, Groube's (r97'1 proposal that West Polynesia's earliest settlers relied on naturally abundant pristine resources in their rapid colonization of the region is IIrefuted ll by evidence from lIances tral Polynesian society" which, ac cording to the authors, originated some seven centuries later. Best Ir984), who has excavated the only finely stratified, undisturbed deposits dating to initial occupa tion of the region, finds much in his data to support elements of Groube's proposition.
A similar note of caution should be voiced over the weight placed on semantic values assigned to recon structed lexical forms in characterizing lIancestral Poly nesian society." The WOlter und Sachen method works best where the denotata of reconstructed lexical forms are material objects and becomes intractable when the IIthing" referred to is a social relation structured by a complex of interdependent rights and duties. A case in point is the claim, based on linguistic data that have since been questioned (Lichtenberk r9861, that the in stitution of hereditary chie! was part of "ancestral Poly nesian society. II The term ·'ariki is securely recon structed for Proto-Polynesian, but the semantic value. assigned it is modeled on the rights, duties, and modes of succession associated with chiefs of contact-era soci eties in full land situations. Since sociopolitical power in contact-era Polynesia was rooted in some degree of con trol over access to land, could the rights and duties of an • 'ariki in a "propagule" of fewer than roo persons on an island covered with virgin forest have been comparable to those of a contact-era chief? This is an important is sue in Polynesian prehistory, and the authors should be commended for attacking it with synchronic linguistic data. Diachronic archaeological data will contribute to an understanding of social and political change in prehis toric Polynesia when investigations focus on tbe mate rial preconditions for establishing specific sets of social relations IHommon 19761.
A list of "hypotheses of evolutionary processes" is pre sented for IItesting" against the Polynesian prehistoric record, but, according to Dunnell1r9801, there is as yet no decisive test for competing mechanisms of evolution ary change. The statement that archaeology is able "to reveal ... the selective forces that resulted in change and divergence" suggests one, but it is not described. One is needed to differentiate evolutionary study from descrip tive phylogeny.
Confusion is introduced by the suggestion that both isolation and external contact lead to divergence, which seems to represent a shift in scales of comparison. fllso lation" here apparently refers to subunits within the Polynesian "phylogenetic unit" and "external contact" to contact between Polynesians and non-Polynesians.
The dangling question of contact within the Polynesian "phylogenetic unitl/ and its evolutionary effect once loomed too large in the minds of prehistorians but still deserves theoretical treatment. These points aside, the central thesis that Polynesian prehistory provides a promising field for rigorous histor ical study is well taken. Scholars unfamiliar with Kirch's and Green's substantial contributions will find them re warding.
CHRIS GOSDEN
Department of Archaeology, La Trobe University. Bundoora. Victoria 3083. Australia. 8 IV 87
The idea of evolution is one of the intellectual common places of our time. A commentator on Darwin's in· fluence has summed up the impact of his thought as follows: "During the past hundred years or so evolution ary Lheory has functioned in our culture like a myth in a period of belief, moving effortlessly to and fro between metaphor and paradigm, feeding an extraordinary range of disciplines beyond its original biological field" (Beer 1985:171. Because the idea of evolution is such a central part of our scientific and popular culture, it is difficult to resist the suspicion that problems are often cast in a familiar evolutionary framework to make them seem better understood than in fact they are. This is my main impression of Kirch and Green's article.
The authors seem to imply that the hard work of thinking about Pacific prehistory is mainly done. We have a framework of interpretation (the phylogenetic model), and the main necessity now is more survey and excavation to provide missing data points. However, much necessary justification is missing from their argu ment. The first and most basic question remains unan swered-why use an evolutionary framework at all? As far as I can ascertain, their chief reason is that an evolu· tionary framework enables us to study history. I fully concur with their interest and feel that the recent resur gence of work in the specific historical contexts of social change and human action in both anthropology and ar chaeology is extremely healthy. What I am not at all sure about is whether one can profitably use a biological anal ogy to understand human history. Biologists study the history of species, which generally span millions of years; it is uncertain how far their concepts allow us to interpret the last 3,000 years of Pacific prehistory. At the least the use of an evolutionary framework requires some justification. The limits to the analogy between change in biological species and social change also need discussion. Much of the most interesting recent work in palaeontology has concerned the rate of continuity of change in species, centring upon the debate over punc tuated equilibrium. Kirch and Green make no mention of the uncertainties in the discipline from which they take their framework, nor do they discuss their position on the nature of social change or its rates. It is important to know how far they think an evolutionary analogy can be pushed.
Uncertainty also surrounds their idea of history. In order to understand history within an evolutionary framework, it is necessary to distinguish between ho mologous traits, considered by them the very mark of history, and analogous ones. By this reading, history is reduced to inheritance, a usage familiar to biologists per· haps but not to social scientists, who would include con tinuity, coincidence, and disjunction, that is, homology, analogy, and much more. Homology is distinguished from analogy here by reference to a reconstructed ances tral Polynesian society. Historical linguistics plays a ma jor part in this reconstruction, supplying a whole series of terms for status and kin differences from protolan guages. Status terms are compared with ethnographic accounts of Polynesian societies to flesh out possible relations between people 2,500 years ago. There is, how ever, no certainty that semantic shifts have not occurred in the intervening period. Nor are the ethnographic cate gories of Polynesian society as stable as they appeared 20 years ago. Sahlins's (r981, 19851 These variations are due to multiple factors, among them environment (there are high and low island groups in Polynesia) and the degree of contact with other regions. The linchpin of the authors' study is the data provided by archaeology. Archaeological investigation is rela tively recent in the region, having started in a systematic way only early in the 10th century and truly developed after the hiatus created by the events of World War II. The increasing quantity of anthropological data cur rently available for various island groups together with the development of sophisticated methods of dating ar chaeological materials have made possible such conclu sions as are put forth by Kirch and Green. This impor tant and masterful work should stimulate additional thought and research.
JOHN TERRELL
Field Museum of Natural History, Roosevelt Rd. at Lake Shore Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A. 8 Methodologically, this article revives proposals en trenched in 19th-century inductivism and the atheoret ical (even antitheoreticall skepticism of the likes of Franz Boas (e.g., 1896). It can be argued that practical methodologies are not built on such prescriptions ITer rell1981, r986b:6-1" 141-431. Why, then, do Kirch and Green bring back these requirements? They appear to be looking at the world from a historical linguist's point of view. Their research agenda and the methodology they prescribe for it have been set, it seems, by the agenda and procedures of the comparative method, and they are im plying that what works for historical linguistics will work (and already hasl for Polynesian archaeology. While Green and his colleague Andrew Pawley have vigorously developed linguistic scenarios for Pacific pre history (Pawley and Green r973, 19841 . such an analyt ical framework is not without its difficulties (Terrell 1986b:143-S4 )·
If we accept the elementary (and not very realistic)
view that when a parent or "proto-" language splits, its descendants go on to change in separate ways in isola tion (i.e., historically related languages change, or radiate, as independent isolatesI. then:
I. To reconstruct the parent language of a family or subgroup of related languages, we may compare its de scendants to see what they have in common because if the languages studied are independent witnesses, then what they have in common is probably what they have inherited from their common parent. This approach, in simple terms, might be called "the sift-through the-differences-to-find -the -similarities -that-must-also be-homologies-or-identities" research program. Simi larly, Kirch and Green infer, if we want to reconstruct ancestral Polynesian society, it may be equally appropri ate to look for common threads shared by different Poly nesian societies, modem or archaeological. Yet doing so is not without its dangers, because, as they acknowl edge, isolation and living on islands do not automati cally go together even in Polynesia (Kirch and Yen 1981; Terrell 1986b :lll-S1I. Nor is it easy to assume that sociocultural similarities that resemble ancestral traits are necessarily homologies, Le., intergenerational learned transmissions rather than reinventions.
1. Following the prescriptions of the comparative method, a properly reconstructed subgroup or family of languages is in a way by default also a phylogenetic tree of the languages included. We need history to understand human diversity just as biologists of the living world need paleontology to understand organic diversity (Terrell and Fagan 1975) . But we should not beg the question "How much history do we need to know?/! by insisting that we must first reconstruct phylogenetic units and trace our way back to ancestral prototypes. Like Darwin, let us also deduce and model causal processes so that we can judge how much of a slice of time we need to study (Clark and Terrell 1978, Terrell I986a) .
Kirch and Green apparently agree with Gould that ukind, extent, and amount of similarity provide the pri mary data of historical science" (Gould 1986:66) . It is true that the primacy of similarity is a deeply rooted bias in Western thought. However, a strong case can be made for the primacy of diversity-both similarities and dif· ferences-in Nature and in the realm of human affairs as the fundamental paradox at the heart of all scientific work (Terrell 1977:237-39, I986b:267-68) . Antbropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02l38, U.S.A. 10 IV 87 This article is an exciting application to Polynesian cuI· tural history of what has previously been called "the genetic modeL" Kirch and Green's first accomplishment is to argue cogently that the model is better labeled "the phylogenetic model," thereby placing emphasis upon its essential aspect-"the delineation of phylogenies or his torical sequences of divergence hom a common ances tor." I am convinced by their argument and have already adopted their suggestion in a forthcoming article (Vogt n.d.) that brings the Maya case up to date.
EVON Z. VOGT
Department of
In spite of the fact that the model was first developed and applied in Mesoamerica (Romney '957, Vogt 1964) , Mesoamericanists have been slow to embrace and utilize it. There have been only three notable excep tions: Flannery and Marcus 11983) have published a bril liant application of the model to Zapotec and Mixtec cultural history in Oaxaca, and Lee has successfully ap plied it to the extinct Coxoh Maya of the upper Grijalva River basin (Lee '979, Lee and Markham 1976) and to the prehistory of the Tzotzil-Tzeltal of highland Chiapas (Lee 1985) .
In their application of the model to Polynesia, Kirch and G1een introduce a useful refinement to keep the three strands clear: a nice distinction among I'protolan guage," I'ancestral culture," and '(parental population," Along all of these strands, it is clear that the Polynesian ists are now well ahead of the Mayanists in their recon struction of the protolanguage and their search for the Polynesian homeland, as well as in their reconstruction of ancestral Polynesian society and of the vari.ations therefrom. Both the Maya area and Polynesia are badly in need of additional research on biological similarities and variations, especially genetic studies, in their indige nous populations. An impressive beginning has been re cently made in the study of genetic characteristics in Polynesian populations Isee Kirch 1985bl, but for further progress we all need to study closely the methods and conclusions of the path-breaking work of G1eenbe1g and his collaborators ( , see also Greenberg 1987 on the comparison of linguistic, dental} and genetic evidence bearing upon the aboriginal settlement of the Americas.
I am delighted to see the phylogenetic model so pro ductively utilized in Polynesia, and it is my hope that this paper will inspire other scholars to apply it in still other parts of the world.
R. L. WELSCH
Field Museum of Natural History, Roosevelt Rd. at Lake Shore Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A. 8 IV 87 Kirch and Green present a formal (and, they assume, rigorous) methodology for demonstrating a phylogenetic unit, which they say in principle should represent a set of populations or communities with a common genetic} linguistic, and cultural ancestral population. This they feel is a necessary first step for investigating cultural evolution. It is, however, questionable whether such an elaborate procedure is widely applicable to areas without the kind of isolation presumed for Polynesia. Certainly it cannot be usefully applied if comparative linguistic data are not available. Nor is it clear that their arduous (but perhaps less rigorous than assumedl methodology for demonstrating phylogenetic units has any obvious payoff.
In most ordinary settings, human groups are con stantly interacting with groups and communities that do not originate in the same ancestral units (either linguis tically, culturally, or geneticallyI, and if evolutionary processes have any meaning at all, they will certainly be actively shaping these communities. I should think that it is just this sort of complex sex of conditions that makes evolutionary questions interesting for anthropologists and archaeologists. As a special case, Polynesia may of fer some useful insights into evolutionary processes, but to understand cultural evolution requires methods and models of evolutionary processes that can be understood and applied in more typical situations. Kirch and Green/s notion of cultural evolution seems an overly simplistic analogy drawn from biology, a conception that was actively being debated when Steward, Romney, and Vogt were writing. They offer very little that is ana lytically new, and several points are insufficiently thought through.
It is not clear from this article (or from the literature, for that matter) how binding "inherited" cultural pat terns are on changing human communities. Each new generation may not create every aspect of its society anew, but it is not bound to flinherited" patterns in the way that organisms are typically bound to their genes. Isolating a phylogenetic unit may well insure that the study communities have something that is culturally "inherited" along some historical pathway, but as far as I can understand, such historical pathways do not imply a causal force in any general sense. What can the authors mean, for example, by saying that certain bark-cloth de signs and tattooing "may be explained by common in heritance/! from Lapita decorations? Given some ob served similarity between bark cloth, tattoos, and Lapita sherds, what kind of explanation (in any evolutionary sense) do the authors intend as a result of a common historical pathway?
Despite Kirch and Green/s insistence to the contrary, the data from Polynesia's archaeological record are so thin that they appear obliged to draw historical, phy logenetic, and evolutionary conclusions from linguistic markers. Clearly, hypothetical protolanguage recon structions can tell us very little about the daily social processes that may have inspired the terms, the context in which they were used, or the social forms to which they were applied. This is not evolutionary analysis but a return to late r9th-and early 20th-century speculation using linguistic clues in the absence of any more sub stantial data from other independent sources.
The most convincing examples of evolutionary argu ments alluded to are, not surprisingly, very narrowly focused studies that link environmental variables with cultural variations. Such examples are reminiscent of the work of Steward and, while plausible, do little to advance our understanding of cultural evolution much farther. Unfortunately, the state of the art in Polynesia seems to consist in either these small focused studies or the employment of all of the traditional gimmicks that have been exploited by archaeologists and anthropolo gists in the Pacific for a century. Kirch and Green seem to be discussing important mat ters on a highly abstract plane from a very restricted point of view. I cannot evaluate archaeological method ology. Furthermore, I am more interested in typological comparison than in historical matters, although I do not exclude historical data ipso facto. Perhaps I can provide a linguistic parallel:
For decades now I have been filling requests for data and commentary from etlmotaxonomists: kinship sets, color systems, ethnobotanical systems, ethnozoological systems, and others. Generally speaking, my corre spondents inferred evolutionary development from the simplest to the most complex systems. Historically speaking, I found this counterintuitive and tried to find out if they were really thinking phylogenetically rather than ontogenetically or what-not. Their data were usu ally from genetically diverse sources, and I could seldom see any justification for historical inference or conclu sion. As far as I could see, the conclusions were the result of typological comparison. Unfortunately, none of them responded. I feel that the matter is of basic intel lectual importance. It amounts to seeking a valid answer to the question, "How does one evaluate inferred facts?"
No reasons (let alone proofl have been given for assum ing that various domains of culture are subject to the same language encoding processesi besides, no evidence has been advanced to show that like domains exist uni versally. In fact, almost all of the studies I have seen look remarkably like ethnocentric projections onto xeno graphic areas. However, for the sake of clarity, let us restrict ourselves to matters of colour. Simplified, Kay and Berlin set up a series of stages as follows: Stage r, white, black; Stage 2, white, black, red; ... Stage 7, black, white, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, grey (eight to eleven terms). (For fuller list ing, see Branstetter 1977 , Kim 1985 , Kay and McDaniel 1978 .) Branstetter (1977 does try to provide historical reconstructions of individual lexical items and set forth prehistoric colour systems, and Kim (19851 has done a magnificent job of depicting the Korean colour system from within. However, both seem more or less to accept the validity of the pre'sumed evolutionary sequence. Many of the assumptions involved strike me as gratui tous.
The most recent trends in folk taxonomy seem to favour universal categories as against cultural relativ ism. I have no argument with Kay and McDaniel's (1978) contention that the human organism is so built that it conforms to particular categorizations of the colour spectrum: human beings see the way they do. But to go from there to saying that (the) Tahitian (Ianguagel en codes colours in keeping with Stage (n) is a very long step. Such statements are basically inaccurate and mis leading. Languages are cultural phenomena, produced and transmitted by human beings, who do any encoding that there is to be done. Furthermore, the time element has to be tied down more carefully; an ethnographic present tense will not do. FinallYI such a statement is contrary to fact as far as the Tahitian language is con cerned. Tahiti has been in contact with the outside world, particularly with Western civilization} for some 200 years now and has not yet acquired a proper word for "colour." It is still very difficult to ask a Tahitian in Tahitian for a list of basic colour terms. It is not that he has any difficulty in handling abstractions but simply that he abstracts differently. An abstraction that would include colour terms would include words such as mottled, striped, spotted. A taxonomy is a way of or ganizing items/ and itemization of the observed world is only part of the task.
Historicity? There has been a set of three mutually contrasting terms covering the visible spectrum/ extend ing back to Proto-Polynesian: tea < "tea "light (colour!," uri < "Iuli "dark (colour!," lura < "kula "ruddy (col ourl·" Contemporaneous with but outside this set there has been the colour term relarela < *reyareljQ f1 yellow (colour) ." This is an adjectival formed by reduplication from the noun lela "ginger/ yolk} pollen 'l < ·lelJQ IIgin· ger, yolk, (ii," giving us a modicum of historical gram mar. The ternary set is not fully extinct even today; it was better known in r940 and alive though a bit old fashioned in r800. [ hypothesize that the term for "yel low/I became an incremental core around which a new cluster of colour and other descriptive terms has gradu ally been developing into a new system ever since. In 1900, for the folk taxonomist, it was approximately en coded: black, white, red, yellow, grue, (grey), violet, pink. "Grey" (rehu "ash, grey" < refu "ash, [?] grey"l is included in parentheses because it has the basic meaning of /lash," which Kay and company exclude. The idea of /forange" is expressed as "orange (the fruit) yellow." There is no good native word for "brown/ I though some shades are expressed by t1grey" and others by /fred." The French word chocolat has been used quite a bit. Since 19001 the term I/grue l ' has been more or less artificially and arbitrarily replaced by "grue'l = "blue'l and t1grass" = "green." But there are still people (including myself) who say IIgrass grue" for IIgreen" and "(ocean) grue" for "blue. II In any case, that does give us a glimpse into cultural linguistic history. The original ternary set did not evolve; it was overwhelmed.
Reply PATRICK V. KIRCH AND ROGER C. GREEN
Seattle, Wash. 98I95, U.S.A. 7 v 87
As usual, a claim that some form of evolutionary method or model involving culture may prove produc tive in the analysis of a particular area's prehistory draws the expected types of response: If stale evolutionary framework/' "19th-century inductivism and atheoret ical (even antitheoretical) skepticism," or "a return to late r9th-and early 20th-century speculation using lin guistic clues." Such comment is neither conducive to fruitful discussion nor helpful except to indicate its au thor's hostility toward any renewed exploration of this topic. These people dismiss out of hand any argument that uses the term "evolution'l; they have no need of the concept or procedures based on it and prefer to do their prehistory by other means. This is the position of Gos den with his emphasis on "social change," Terrell with his insistence that "diversity" is the primary concept in scientific work, and Welsch with his view that in ordi nary situations IIconstant interaction'l between non related groups is the main problem requiring analysis.
In contrast are the supportive comments of Bellwood, Rowe, and Vogt, to which there is little to add. However, Bellwood raises one point worth emphasis, namelYI that the approach should be applicable in large island and continental areas as well. Certainly the Mesoamerican cases cited by ourselves and Vogt demonstrate this, as does Bellwood's (r9851 own work in Island Southeast Asia. One could further cite the potential of these proce dures in parts of Africa (as in the Nile Valley or the Bantu case) or in Japan, large portions of China, or sub stantial areas of northern North America. These are just some of the more obvious places where the methodology has a chance of success because biologically, linguis tically, and culturally related groups have recently, and for some time in the past, occupied a given zone. Poly nesia, while it has certain advantages l is not the atypical or special case Welsch claims, nor is the ordinary world of recent prehistory totally dominated by constant in teraction between randomly distributed and nonrelated groups.
Serious discussion of the hallmarks of a modem evolu tionary approach in archaeology owes much to Dunnell, and not surprisingly his comments are both critical and insightful. In his terms our conceptual framework would not qualify as "scientific evolution," only a transformed kind of ffcultural evolution'l at the specific societal level. He feels it still entangles us with positions that are both Lamarckian and essentialist.
With regard to Lamarckism, the problem one faces is the necessity of dealing with cultural as well as solely genetic modes of transmission and therefore of em ploying a mechanism for the inheritance of "acquired characteristics." Indeed, in our present understanding, cultural variation does not simply arise randomly; peo ple frequently invent identical ideas almost simulta neously and are often purposively innovative in response to natural and cultural selective pressures. These new cultural patterns, which confer greater "fitness" on the individuals that adopt them, are then transmitted not only generationally but laterally and even between ge netically unrelated groups. Thus our answer to Welsch would be that within a phylogenetic unit long-lasting cultural similarities that constitute valid homologies be tween groups (because they can be demonstrated to have arisen through transmission from an ancestral entity along historical pathways common to those groupsI are phenomena whose existence (not origin) is to be ex plained by the cultural as opposed to genetic mechanism of transgenerational inheritance and not by the opera tion of some kind of contact between the groups or by continuing reinvention or parallel innovation. Gosden is quite wrong, however, in the claim that our whole idea of history reduces simply to inheritance and does not include continuity, coincidence, disjunction, and much more, as is revealed by OUI discussion of convergence, founder effect (random lossI, failed colonies on small is lands (extinctions I, innovation, and short-and long-term adaptation. A concern with Lamarckian issues of inher itance is thus not some fatal flaw, only one of the neces sary considerations in cultural matters.
Dunnell's charge of essentialism is founded on the view that to talk of entities is to commit the fallacy of viewing "things" as empirically existing rather than see ing them in the Darwinian sense of continuously chang ing phenomena in the process of becoming. Our problem is that while we agree that this is so with all conceptions of entities, where it is the variation rather than the II type" that is real, operationally we still have to de scribe as shorthand reference points empirical "some things" in time and space when describing actual evolu tionary sequences. Hence the paleontologist's use of extinct "species" in phylogenetic models, both with and without branching, to order the entities recovered in terms of time and degree of posited relationship. Hence also our labelling of something as ancestral Polynesian society, Proto-Polynesian language, and parental Polyne sian population. All were continuously changing en~ tities with quite varied features, and as with a protolan guage one merely picks as a reference point some particular time, place, and content within the recon~ structed continuum on which to focus the description.
Here we might remark, because it draws comment by a number of people, that in our view the current level of understanding of ancestral Polynesian society is still very rudimentary and constitutes only a starting place for further work. We certainly agree with Gosden, Dye, and Tetrell lal that we do not expect to rely solely on comparative linguistics for this kind of inlormation, Ibl that semantic-history hypotheses for proto·meanings in the social and political domain are more difficult to de velop than for some materially based items subject to easier direct documentation by archaeology, and (cl that archaeologists need to develop their own independent means for recovering data that bear on such social issues as ranking, segmentation in social and political units, and household differentiation Ie!. Green r9861. Dunnell's view that we are somehow fitting theory to facts none of which were collected in the framework described may be contrasted with Dye's remark that the strategy proposed looks like "the agenda for Green's ca reer in Oceania." The point is that the facts gathered have not been randomly accumulated but collected, as all "facts" must be, within some conceptual framework, in this case a framework that had the reconstruction of phylogeny as one, though not its only, objective. Thus a definite strategy has been followed over two or three decades, and this is why it is now possible la) to make the attempt to disentangle some of the thorny issues of analogy and homology within an explicit methodology for regional culture change and (bl to outline some hy potheses of how that change might have occurred or the similarities arisen so that continued archaeological work can discover, describe, and explain the phenomena in a relevant and useful format. The evolutionary frame work employed is nOt simply some fashionable "win dow dressing" unrelated to what has gone before, nor does it imply, as Gosden claims, that the hard work of thinking about Pacific prehistory is mainly done. Our view is that the hard work of thinking about Polynesian prehistory can now seriously begin, since we can hardly claim that we are in anywhere near the same position with regard to Melanesia and Micronesia, where few "facts" have been consistently collected within any par ticular conceptual scheme, where dense and continuous sequences are seldom available, and where potential phylogenies for linguistic, biological, and archaeological materials are still largely unclear.
Dye and Welsch both raise the issue of "external con tacts" as being of some importance everywhere to ar~ chaeological explanations of both similarity and diller ence. Our view is that isolation and external contact are two ways of looking at the same thing, and by "external contact" we mean not just contact from outside the Polynesian region as a whole but contact beyond the individual island or archipelago (see discussion of units abovel. In Polynesia the extent of divergence in isola tioD, coupled with the false notion of a cessation of voy~ aging in the past, has to some extent been overem~ phasized. Continuing contact between island groups and within them has been the norm throughout the occupa tion sequences of many islands and island groups.
In respect of ancestral Polynesian society, Dye Icor rectly in our view) argues that on the available evidence the early colonists of Fiji-West Polynesia initially heavily exploited the natural resources of the region. 
